Obama On Russia And Around
Since he was elected as next President of the United States on the historical Tuesday, Obama scheduled several meetings with world leaders including President Medvedev of Russia. Two leaders, both relatively young and active, will talk various subjects on mutual disarmament over the next several years. Here are two issues on which Obama commented on the future change in the American security policy related to Russia: missile defense and nuclear arsenals.
1. Missile Defense (MD).
Russia seems to worry about the MD deployment in Eastern and Central Europe for both practical and theoretical reasons. First, the equipment deployed in the region is the “eye,” “ear,” and probably “brain” of the greater aerial (and outer-space) defense system in Europe. As Russia will not share the system, the deployment will cause destabilization of defense equilibrium in the Greater Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals). Such imbalance, from Moscow’s point of view, redraws political picture between Russia and the US in Europe and the Middle East. Of course, NATO is already superior to Russia in many dimensions of military aspects. However, missile defense (if works) is the Shield of Aegis which comprehensively protects the already-mighty Athena. If Athena becomes unjustly mad, how will we stop her?
Second, the deployment is treated in both Poland and the Czech Republic as a symbol of special trans-Atlantic relationship. Some political analysts claim that such Atlanticism divides Europe into two and the coordination between NATO and the EU will be more difficult.. Some extremists further claim that this division of Europe is the overachieving strategic goal for the United States. While I personally disagree with both statements, I see the political implementation of the deployment in the region. After all, the missile defense system has not yet worked out. Political will from both Poland (or the Czech Republic) and the US seems to drive this deployment. From Moscow’s point view, it can have a domino effect towards Ukraine.
Obama has made clear that he has not yet given a “go” sign to the MD deployment. Many speculates that the motive of this cautiousness comes from his new policy towards Russia, and others claim that he simply does not want to spend unnecessary money.
2. Nuclear Arsenals.
Obama envisions to drastically reduce the US nuclear arsenals to promote peace in the world. While such action can strengthen the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) implementation, Obama’s stance on willingness to talk with Iran may be viewed as compromise in front of such unilateral reduction. As being a Japanese, I never disagree such promising non-nuclear world. However, multilateral reduction including Russia, if possible, is the best case scenario without doubt.
Further, the exception was made for India regarding (civil) nuclear technology transfer at the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Is this exception applicable to, say, Nepal? If we trust India, but not Nepal, we must have legal reason for such distinction. So far, the IAEA decision seems to be political and economical rather than moral or legal. If this all nuclear policy is based on power politics, can we legitimize the nuclear control by the IAEA or other organizations? Obama has been criticizing the Bush administration taking the path of power politics, and talks about “change.” Then, Obama and his administration must present tougher (or at least standardized) criteria on nuclear regulation, in order to obtain maximum effect from nuclear force reduction.
Regarding the US-Russian relationship, there are several unsolved issues on oil trade, Georgia, free market, WTO membership, human rights for journalists, the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty, and so on. We continue to observe what agreements those two young leaders will reach.
Category: Columns, Long Castling
